Fake Barn CountryWe may not know, but we think we do.Awareness, Experience, and Facts about Experiences- August 25, 2005 Let's say that S is aware of X just in case S is in some intentional state at least partly about X. Now consider: (A1) It is conceptually necessary that if S is currently having a conscious experience e, then...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004768.html PETA, Slavery, and Non-human Animals- August 23, 2005 PETA sparks outrage once again. The New Haven Register reports: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, a national animal rights group, posted giant photographs of people, mostly black Americans, being tortured, sold and killed, next to photographs of animals,...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004767.html Defective Speech Acts- August 19, 2005 Conversations with a philosopher from Austin and reading a philosopher named Austin have helped me considerably in coming up with several of these examples. (1) It's raining, but I don't believe it is. (2a) I promise to go, but I...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004766.html A Short Argument- August 14, 2005 It would take too much stage-setting to say how or why this is important, so I'm just going to present it. It's a short argument to prove that by sincerely saying that I believe P I neednt express a belief...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004765.html The Luckiest Epistemologist on the Face of the Earth- August 10, 2005 I'm defending my dissertation in a few weeks and going to Texas Tech for the school year to perform Moore's proof in front of a larger audience of intro students. This means that Fake Barn Country is receiving its first...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004764.html An Inconsistent Set- August 10, 2005 This post was inspired by a dissertation workgroup session, in which we discussed Ben Fiedor's work. The following propositions appear to be inconsistent. (1) You ought to believe many and various things. (2) If you ought to believe something, then...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004763.html Unalloyed Reliabilism and Knowledge by Pure Speculation- August 9, 2005 It has recently been cleverly argued that knowledge is reliable belief, no truth required. Call the view "unalloyed reliabilism." An unalloyed reliabilist should have something to say about claims like this one recently made by former ambassador Joe Wilson. Wilson...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004762.html An Argument Against Dream Skepticism ... For Some of Us- August 5, 2005 It's hard to find fault with this argument. (1) I am a caretaker for a human infant. (2) At any given time, it is highly unlikely that a human infant's caretaker is asleep. (3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004761.html Expressing Intentions in the English Language- August 3, 2005 I ran into stiff opposition last time on a matter of formulation. (Many thanks to everyone who chimed in.) Since formulation is half the battle, I have to ask, which if any of the following do you readily recognize as...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004760.html Certainty without Knowledge- August 2, 2005 On Sportscenter last night Buster Olney said: There are other major players that I'm sure - but I don't know for sure - took steriods. The context: Rafael Palmeiro was suspended for violating the league's steriods policy. Olney was saying...http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/Blog/Archives/004758.html |